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MONROE FREEDMAN'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LAWYERS:
ENGAGEMENT, ENERGY, AND ETHICS
Lawrence J. Fox*
Susan R. Martyn**

I.

INTRODUCTION

What an honor to be included in a collective tribute to the life of
mutual
hero, Professor Monroe Freedman: a brilliant man, his love
our
of the law and his celebration of lawyering were the stuff of legends.
From our perspective, as professional responsibility students sitting at
his knee, no one brought more imaginative and, simultaneously,
practical thinking to this topic.
Monroe Freedman never stopped his one-man campaign to improve
the human condition, urging lawyers, judges, and law professors to exalt
the dignity of clients, expanding the notion of zealous advocacy, while
still recognizing that there must be limits, but that they must be crafted
narrowly to reflect society's most fundamental interests.
Fearless in his efforts to establish a client-centered approach to
lawyering, he did not hesitate, even when he was threatened, to join
issue with the forces of darkness. But he did so with consummate good
will, good humor, and an unruffled sense of confidence in the power of
his advocacy that pervaded his work. He has left all of us who labor in
the professional vineyards a legacy of engagement, energy, and ethics,
exactly what he set out to accomplish. His voice is silent now, but read
any of Monroe's written legacies and you can hear his voice, his very
distinctive voice, uttering those wise words we were lucky enough to
hear in person.

* George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School and
Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP.
** Distinguished University Professor and Stoepler Professor of Law and Values Emeritus,
University of Toledo College of Law.
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ENGAGEMENT

Early in his professional career, Monroe displayed his lifelong
courage to confront some of the most difficult issues that lawyers face in
representing clients. He did this by engaging the practicing bar, judges,
and academics, relentlessly searching for the truth wherever it led him.
It all began when he gave a lecture to lawyers in which he
examined the then-Canons of Legal Ethics and concluded that they
created conflicting obligations for criminal defense lawyers in dealing
with client perjury.1 He argued that the duty of competence (to learn
everything possible about a client's case) and the duty of confidentiality
(to refuse to disclose or use all information learned) conflicted with the
obligation established by the ethics rules to reveal a client's perjury to a
court when a lawyer possesses actual knowledge of the perjury.
Monroe's observations so outraged then-Judge Warren Burger and
two other federal judges that they filed a professional disciplinary
complaint against Monroe for expressing this opinion. But Monroe,
convinced he had something to say, had the courage and conviction to
continue his advocacy despite this attempt to silence him. He
successfully defended the disciplinary proceeding,2 and while his license
to practice stood challenged, he turned the speech into a now-famous,
widely read, and much celebrated law review article.3
Forty years and two sets of disciplinary rules later, he continued to
challenge us to confront the same conundrum, documenting the trilemma
he initially exposed and addressing not just the text of the relevant rule
and the cases that construed it, but also applauding the changes in
viewpoint of those who initially advocated against his view.4 Monroe
concluded that, despite an apparent change in the relevant rule of
professional conduct, courts continued to wrestle with the disquiet
caused by the "critical policy issue" he raised so long ago, producing an
approach very close to his original proposal.'
Monroe's willingness to reexamine the issue of client perjury
characterizes his engagement with his critics. He welcomed the
1. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133, 133-34 (2008).
2. Id. at 138.
3. Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469-84 (1966).
4. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 151-86 (4th
ed. 2010).
5. Freedman, supra note 1, at 148. They do so by disingenuously construing the knowledge
requirement of the rule, which makes it "reasonably certain that a lawyer who chooses to honor her
client's confidences will not be found to have violated Model Rule 3.3." Id. at 147.
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opportunity to rethink and expand on his earlier conclusions. He did this
by returning to the core principles that he believed should govern the
client-lawyer relationship.6 For example, on the issue of discrediting
truthful witnesses, he relied on "fiduciary obligations to our client, our
promise to maintain confidentiality, our client's reliance on that promise,
and our client's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him." 7 In discussing the view of other commentators who reached a
similar result, Monroe unearthed what he called their "cynical
justification": that is, "winning the case at hand."'
Susan also had the pleasure of admiring Monroe Freedman's
engagement with her local practicing bar in Toledo. In offering an
afternoon of ethics hypotheticals, Susan vividly remembers the moment
he presented a case he had discussed at length in his treatise. 9 In
response, the vast majority of the local bar disagreed with Monroe's
view that the client should come first. The Toledo lawyers explained to
Monroe: "That's not how we practice law here," and "We believe in
professionalism." Monroe's response was classic, measured, and true:
First, he told the large audience to be sure that they remembered their
client, who will have to live with the decision. Then, he reminded them
that an uninformed client could have remedies against a lawyer who fails
to communicate.
III.

ENERGY

Monroe's engagement with the legal profession flowed from his
energy, which seemed to compel him to engage with both practicing
lawyers and those in the academy when we considered his work. Susan
personally experienced this energy when she wrote one footnote (out of
167) in a book review of Modern Legal Ethics by Charles Wolfram."o
She commented that Freedman's criticism of Wolfram on the client
perjury issue was "unfair" because Wolfram had in fact documented the
profession's lack of agreement about, and factual limitations of, the
relevant rule."
6. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, 71-74 (1975)
(discussing the lawyer's role in advising clients and when it might cross the line from giving legal
information to "active instrument" of client fraud).
7. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supranote 4, at 213.
8. Id.
9. See id at 379-400 (discussing scenarios where opposing counsel takes advantage of an
adversary's mistake).
10. Susan R. Martyn, The Ethic of Modem Legal Ethics, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 267, 282
n.144 (1987).
11. Id.
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Susan had not yet met Monroe Freedman, but she was about to; he
wrote her a lovely letter that informed her why she was mistaken. She
wrote back, telling him why she did not agree. He then asked his legal
ethics class to vote on who was correct, and called her to let her know
that his class voted him the winner! Not quite a fair fight, but compelling
evidence of his boundless energy to take on all comers.
Wolfram's treatise and the book review were written shortly before
the Supreme Court decided Nix v. Whiteside.12 Chief Justice Burger
penned the majority opinion in that case, which affirmed a criminal
conviction, despite the fact that the defense lawyer successfully
dissuaded his client from lying by threatening to disclose any perjured
testimony. While some might have expected this U.S. Supreme Court
pronouncement would define the lawyer's role confronting client
perjury, it in fact did not. The message of Monroe's earlier-cited article
continued to enjoy broad professional support;" indeed, the current
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct recognize that the requirements of
rule 3.3 are subordinated to the defendant's constitutional rights. 14
Another example of the same energy and follow-through occurred
when Monroe signed on to an amicus brief we penned on behalf of the
Ethics Bureau at Yale and ninety-two legal ethics professionals and
professors." Six members of the court majority cited this brief in
support of their conclusion that all three of his pro bono lawyers had
abandoned the petitioner, Mr. Maples.' A year later, Monroe and the
other signatories to the brief received an email from counsel for one of
these lawyers, informing us that New York had dismissed a disciplinary
action against one of the three because "there was no basis for taking
disciplinary action" against him.' 7
At about the same time, Monroe was working on an article
about the use and effect of professional discipline on death penalty
lawyers and judges. He saw this correspondence, intended to chastise
the amici, as no more than a prime example of the failure of
disciplinary counsel to take action in cases of what he described

12.
13.

475 U.S. 157 (1986).
Freedman, supra note 1, at 142-45.

14.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmts. 7-9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).

15. Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and Practitioners and the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63).
16. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 925 n.8; Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and Practitioners and the
Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supranote 15, at 23-27.
17.

Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalDiscipline of Death Penalty Lawyers and Judges, 41

HOFSTRA L. REv. 603, 613 (2013).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/3

4

Fox and Martyn: Monroe Freedman's Contributions to Lawyers: Engagement, Energy, a

2016]1

MONROE FREEDMAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LAWYERS

639

as "clear on [the facts of the Supreme Court record]."" This experience
and others led him to conclude that it was a "pointless exercise" to
draft guidelines for death penalty counsel, as they already existed and
were for the most part not enforced."
Monroe directed his energy at judges and academics, as well
as at practicing lawyers. He argued that electing state judges was
unconstitutional20 and excoriated prosecutors and judges for encouraging
and using cooperating witnesses who lie. 2' He also was one of the
first to raise the profound, but largely ignored, ethical issues that law
professors face.22
Beginning with the proposition that we all bring to the task of
ethics a "significant perspective," 23 he identified law professors as those
who, by and large, have chosen to leave clients behind and, as a result,
tend to exalt societal interests over those of clients. He then asked: "But
what of our students .. . [whom] we have chosen to be involved
with[,] . . . do we champion their interests?"2 4 He examined that question
by applying his own laser focus to create a public discussion of
neglected issues. Sparing no sacred cows, he identified and addressed
sex with students, plagiarism of student work, and due process in
grading, concluding that the first is unprofessional and often an abuse of
power, the second required publication credit, and the third dictated
grade review.
IV.

ETHICS

Monroe Freedman recognized that his concerns about the
professional responsibility of lawyers, judges, and law professors were
generated by his overall view of the role of each. This sent him on an
exploration of the lawyer's purpose in society, a topic on which he spent
the rest of his career elaborating in his characteristically vivid prose.25
18. Id at 612-14.
19. Id. at 603, 621.
20.

See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Unconstitutionality ofElecting State Judges, 26

GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2013) (discussing how electing and re-electing judges violates due
process).
21. Monroe H. Freedman, The Cooperating Witness Who Lies-A Challenge to Defense
Lawyers, ProsecutorsandJudges, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 739, 740-43 (2010).
22. Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three

Neglected Questions, 39 VAND. L. REv. 275, 276-77, 280, 282 (1986).
23. Id. at 275.
24. Id. at 276.
25. Although almost all of his work is suffused with this foundation, we can perhaps see the
best examples in Freedman's Lawyers 'Ethics in an Adversary System, supra note 6, and Freedman
and Smith's UnderstandingLawyers'Ethics, supra note 4.
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He saw the legal system's purpose as preserving rights and the
lawyer's role as giving power and autonomy to clients.2 6 This led him to
articulate the central problem in legal representation: the lawyer's
superior legal knowledge giving the lawyer outsized power in clientlawyer relationships, an imbalance that encourages the paternalism of
lawyers. He saw the lawyer's work as representing the client zealously
within the bounds of the law.27
Monroe's celebration of the client-lawyer relationship remains one
of the brightest, most positive, and definitive explications of the lawyer's
ethical obligations. In fact, Monroe's explorations of these matters
inspired us to identify, articulate, and emphasize these obligations in
agency terms as the lawyer's 5Cs. The lawyer must abide by the client's
right to control the goals of the representation, must be competent, must
communicate, must keep confidences, and must resolve conflicts of
interest. Although thousands of pages have been written about these
obligations, no one came close to Monroe Freedman in articulating and
emphasizing their importance and interrelationship.
Monroe begins with the agency and fiduciary proposition that the
client-principal empowers the lawyer, not vice versa. This means that the
lawyer's exercise of autonomy reaches its pinnacle not in the
representation itself, but in deciding whether and when to represent a
particular client. Because the lawyer's role creates primary obligations to
clients, Monroe emphasized the need to choose clients with care. 2 8 He
wanted lawyers to be clear about the client they were representing, the
tasks that representation required, and the influence that the client would
have on the lawyer and the lawyer's life.
In each situation, Monroe began by confronting moral dilemmas,
because he believed that immorality rested in "failing to address and
resolve the moral conflict in a conscientious and responsible manner."29
He identified the first moral issue each lawyer faces as her own
accountability for the client she chooses to represent. Monroe agreed
with Tom Shaffer that most client-lawyer counseling required
consultation about moral issues.30 But Monroe disagreed with him about
the lawyer's role. The lawyer was not there to make the client "good" as

26.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 15-43.

27. Id. at 68-126.
28. Id. at 52-53, 69-74.
29. Monroe H. Freedman, A Lawyer Doesn't Always Know Best, HUM. RTS., May 1978, at
28, 28.
30. Thomas Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 319, 32930(1987).
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Monroe read Shaffer to suggest, but rather to be in a relationship in
which the lawyer has the power to help. 3 1
Most remember Monroe's work in clarifying the conflicting
loyalties of criminal defense lawyers, including his recent publication
with his colleague, Abbe Smith, which documents just how renowned
defense lawyers actually do their jobs in an imperfect system.3 2 But he
wrote with equal clarity about prosecutors.33 And he had this to say to
students about another kind of client representation: "As you
contemplate the practice of law you should understand that you may be
called upon to represent people who, out of sheer greed, will hurt and
even kill other innocent people. And if you can't handle that then you
should not go into the practice of corporate law." 3 4
Following Susan's talk at Hofstra, Monroe's emphasis on knowing
your client inspired her to write about what she labeled "accidental
clients." Although in most situations lawyers know who their clients are
because they have expressly agreed to represent them, Susan noted that
the law governing lawyers also recognizes what lawyers may think of as
"accidental clients," those a lawyer did not expect, but who are owed the
same fiduciary duties lawyers owe clients they intend to represent. 3 5
Of course, general rules of contract and tort govern the creation of
client-lawyer relationships. However, a lawyer asked to provide legal
advice who fails to say "no" (or offers the advice without charge) can
create an implied client-lawyer relationship if the recipient reasonably
relies on the lawyer's assistance. Courts approach inconsistencies in
descriptions of what occurred from the viewpoint of the reasonable
prospective client.36
Monroe helped us understand that identifying accidental, as well as
intended clients, puts lawyers in the best position to avoid client-lawyer
relationships they do not wish to create and to embrace those they do.
When clear about who are clients, lawyers also know whom to bill and
to whom they owe fiduciary duties.

31.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 8; Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the

Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 331, 331 (1987).
32.

Monroe H. Freedman, Why It's Essential to Represent "Those People," in How CAN You

REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? 73, 73-76 (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013); see also
Freedman, supra note 17, at 605-07.
33.

Monroe H. Freedman, The ProfessionalResponsibility of the ProsecutingAttorney, 55

GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-41 (1967); Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional
Practicesby Prosecutors'Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 16-21 (2010).

34.
35.

Abbe Smith, Monroe Freedman-Heartand Mind, 23 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2015, at 14, 18.
Susan R. Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 914-16 (2005).

36.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

§ 14

(AM. LAW INST. 2000).

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3

642

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:635

Monroe's understanding of lawyers as fiduciaries also helps us
understand why courts hold that lawyers owe clients certain precontractual duties of fairness in bargaining for fees, including the
obligation to explain them. 37 Once a lawyer takes on a representation
and agrees to a fee, full fiduciary duties attach, making any attempt to
modify a fee upward, after the initial agreement, subject to a
presumption that the lawyer-agent has used his power to unduly
influence the client-principal."
The fiduciary duties lawyers assume with each client
representation, what we call the 5Cs, rest on a key agency law insight
that Monroe recognized: lawyers derive power from clients, but our
superior knowledge and skill also allow us to overpower our clients'
interests. Agency law assigns fiduciary duty to lawyers to ensure that
client-defined best interests are promoted in the representation. It
achieves this by recognizing several facets of the obligation essential to
representing the interests of another.
The first facet or C-control-assumes that, like other agents,
lawyers have a duty to act on the client's behalf, subject to the client's
right to define the objectives of the representation. Monroe was
unrelenting in emphasizing that clients have sole authority to determine
the objectives or goals of the representation, while he recognized that
lawyers have sole authority to take actions required by law before
tribunals and to refuse to engage in unlawful conduct. And when clients
and lawyers share authority, Monroe was also clear that lawyers should
defer to clients after the lawyer provides a full explication of the
implications of a client decision."
Monroe also helped us understand the way in which the second Ccommunication-is essential to every aspect of the client-lawyer
relationship.4 0 When a client decision arises, the lawyer must take the
initiative to inform, consult with, and clarify the client's decision. When
a client insists on illegal conduct, the lawyer must inform the client that
the conduct is not permitted and explain why. When a client has decided
upon an objective, the lawyer must consult with the client about the

37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 18, 38.
39. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 63-66.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20.
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means to accomplish it. In agency terms, the outcome of these
consultations creates a lawyer's actual authority to act on behalf
of the client.
In fact, communication enables all of the 5Cs. Just as clients cannot
choose the objectives of a representation without understanding feasible
legal options, lawyers cannot act competently without understanding
what the client hopes to accomplish and knowing how to get there.
Similarly, lawyers need facts sufficient to permit them to apply the law
to a client's situation, and the duty of confidentiality encourages clients
to supply the facts for that process to be successful."1 Monroe's
advocacy of zealous representation and loyalty certainly means that
lawyers must search for and resolve conflicts of interest to avoid
favoring the lawyer's own or some other person's interest over those of
her clients.42
The third C-competence-focuses on why lawyers are hired in the
first place: to provide competent service in a complex legal system that
clients are not able to navigate themselves.4 3 Monroe understood that
legal remedies were essential, but were no panacea for lawyer
incompetence, including malpractice, ineffective assistance of counsel,
and professional discipline; and, he continued to document deficiencies
and controversies in everything he wrote."
The fourth C-confidentiality-assures that clients are encouraged
to share all relevant information with their lawyers. Without gathering
facts, lawyers can mistake what their clients wish to accomplish, what
law is relevant to their clients' circumstances, and other legal options
that might be available to fulfill their client's needs. However, breaching
confidentiality can result in serious harm to client interests. 4 5

Monroe pointed out that modern confidentiality obligations
originated in both agency law (which now resides in the lawyer
disciplinary codes) 46 and the attorney-client privilege, an evidentiary
doctrine.4 7 The agency fiduciary duty protects all information relating to
the representation of a client from the initial prospective client
41.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 128, 133.

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 123-26, 141-44, 285-321, 359-68 (discussing deficiencies and controversies in the

context of proseuctors, government lawyers and torture memos, criminal defense lawyers, and
corporate representation).

45.

Id at 128-29.

46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-86.
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communication throughout the representation and beyond, even after the
client's death or reorganization. The evidentiary privilege is narrower,
limited to prevent litigation disclosures of communications in confidence
between a client and her lawyer (and no one else) for the purpose of
seeking legal advice.48
He also examined and had a significant impact on the development
of confidentiality exceptions. For Monroe, the bedrock principle was
client autonomy. It follows that the express or implied client consent
exception was the core principle and the key to a client-centered
representation based on trust.49 He was eloquent in describing just how
important it was to conduct an extensive dialogue with the client to
ensure that any consent to disclosure was truly informed."o
Monroe also insisted that at least two other exceptions, even when
it did not serve client-perceived interests, must be recognized. Most
jurisdictions recognized a confidentiality exception to prevent future
client crime. Monroe argued that the basis for this exception should not
be triggered by the legal characterization of "crime" or "fraud," but
rather by whether the threat of bodily harm (or substantial financial loss)
was serious enough to disclose without securing client consent."
By virtue of the sheer force and logic of his convictions, Monroe
won the day, successfully urging the Ethics 2000 commission (on
which we sat) and now nearly all jurisdictions, to shift from a
future client crime exception to a future prevention of "reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm" requirement before permissive
disclosure is permitted.5 2
Consistent with his focus on clients, Monroe was far more critical
of other confidentiality exceptions, especially those that granted lawyers
some measure of self-protection.53 Although not entirely critical of
exceptions that permit disclosure of client fraud, he characterized them
as "[s]till [p]rotecting [c]orporate [f]raud."54

48.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 129-34.

49. Id. at 128-29.
50. Id at 52-55.
51. Id at 139-41; Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality:
Restating the Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1631,

1636-39 (1996).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. L.6(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASs'N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66.

53. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 146-47 (discussing collecting fees); see also id.
at 147, 164 (establishing defenses).
54. Id. at 142-46.
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The fifth C-conflicts of interest-because it is the most difficult,
was for Monroe really the first. Client loyalty and zealous advocacy
require lawyers to identify and avoid or resolve conflicts of interest. He
argued that this loyalty obligation was the core of a client-centered
system of lawyers' ethics. The agency duty of loyalty creates the
lawyer's obligation to seek client consent whenever a lawyer's
judgment, from the client's point of view, might reasonably be called
into question. It also prevents client harm by imposing on lawyers
the obligation to recognize and respond to any influences that may
interfere with the lawyer's ability to act in the client's best interests as
defined by the client."
Monroe clarified the way that both agency law and the lawyer
disciplinary rules must recognize that conflicts of interest can arise from
several sources, including the lawyer's own personal interests and the
interests of other clients, third persons, and former clients.56 Pursuing the
client's best interests requires lawyers to remain vigilant in the
identification of conflicts of interest throughout the representation. Once
identified, a conflict must be disclosed to the client(s), unless doing so
would violate another client's confidentiality. And if confidentiality
obligations should intrude into this process, lawyers should resolve the
conflict by not proceeding in the matter."
A lawyer's conflicts are imputed to the lawyer's firm. This
imputation is premised upon the fiduciary principle that all firm lawyers
owe loyalty to all firm clients and the fact that lawyers readily interact
with and depend on each other in firms, if not physically, then
electronically. Monroe understood that large law firms sought what he
called the "ethical illusion of screening"" to limit this imputation, and
he scrutinized their own conflict of interest, agreeing with Larry, that
"there are no clients here to protect their interests." 9 Characteristically,
Monroe found examples in cases where lawyers became subject to
significant losses due to ethical blindness.o

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
(Pa. 1992)).

at 255-70.
at 257-60.
at 267-76.
at 278.
at 279.
at 281-83 (discussing Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1279

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

646

V.

[Vol. 44:635

So WHAT?

Monroe recognized the need for a variety of legal and equitable
remedies to make real the lawyer's obligations. When harm is caused,
the client may seek tort relief.6 If harm is threatened, the client may
seek disqualification or injunctive relief ordering the lawyer to end the
representation of the conflicting interest. 62 Lawyers who proceed in a
representation without disclosing a conflict can provide the client with
grounds for seeking fee forfeiture 63 or a constructive trust of other
property that is implicated.64
As Monroe identified these outcomes, he also was relentless in
pointing out when they were not properly implemented. His criticism of
prosecutors' unrestrained discretion and the lack of any real remedy for
criminal defense lawyer incompetence stand as lasting indictments of
our legal system, 65 blemishes he tried so hard to erase.
Ultimately, he characterized both legal and equitable remedies
as necessary to support the implementation of lawyer fiduciary
duties or the limits on advocacy imposed by other law. He knew
that lawyers who observed client-centered advocacy by understanding
and adhering to their 5C fiduciary duties would not create grounds
for client relief. And, he also understood the need to identify and
stay within the limits of the law.
VI.

ARE THERE LIMITS?

Monroe knew that every agency and client-lawyer relationship is
subject to one significant limitation: neither a client's power of control
nor a lawyer's obligation of loyalty allows either to violate the limits of
the law. Both principal and agent remain responsible for the
consequences of their conduct as autonomous legal persons.66 in other
words, he recognized that zealous advocacy must occur within the
bounds of the law. 6 7
Monroe emphasized that these limits on advocacy should be clear,
recognizing and helping define their margins. The most obvious legal
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
INST. 2000).

62. Id.
63.

§§

48-56 (AM. LAW

6(2), 8; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 270-74, 281-83.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS

64. Id.

§§

§§

6(9), 37.

§ 6(3).

65. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 123-26; see Freedman, supra note 17, at 611-12;
Freedman, supra note 21, at 739-47.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 23(1), 30.
67. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supranote 4, at 114-22.
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limits are created by the criminal law."8 Tort law and, in particular, the
law of fraud create similar limitations.69 Lawyer disciplinary
codes impose additional limits on client advocacy, such as rules
governing ex parte contact with opponents, 7 o defining improper
inducements to settle a matter," and regulating lawyers who serve as
witnesses in client matters.7 2
All these bodies of law impose limits or bounds that restrain
unfettered client allegiance. Monroe understood them, but he also knew
that recognizing these limits does impose a heavy burden on lawyers.
Because lawyers have long advised clients about how to avoid illegality,
they certainly must recognize legal limitations on their own conduct. But
the limitations must be clear, unmistakable, and necessary. He reminded
us that professionalism codes are not entirely harmless when they are
"given force of law by judges who value courtesy to 'brother lawyers'
above 'entire devotion to the interests of the client [and] warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights."' 73
VII.

ENGAGEMENT, ENERGY, AND ETHICS

Monroe Freedman leaves lawyers with the gift of understanding
client representation in practice and in theory. He calls our attention to
the autonomy of our clients and ourselves, which requires identifying
our clients, understanding our fiduciary duty, and identifying the limits
of the law. His legacy of thought and action concerning each of these
obligations leaves us a rich treasure trove that encourages ongoing
engagement and renewed energy to continue his quest for ethical
deliberation. Monroe fostered our understanding of the law governing
lawyers, convincing us that the essence of great legal representation is to
serve our clients well by representing them zealously within the bounds
of the law.

68.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d),

8.4(b) (AM.

BAR Ass'N 2014);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 6, 30.
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d), 4.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 51, 95, 98.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2, 4.3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 98-99; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 106-14.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

LAW
LAW
LAW
LAW

GOVERNING LAWYERS § 108.
73. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 122.
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